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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.    
These consolidated mandamus petitions require us 
to decide whether two professional photographers 
bringing separate copyright infringement actions are 
bound by a forum selection clause in contracts they did not 
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sign. We conclude that the photographers are not bound 
because they are not intended beneficiaries of the 
agreements, nor are they closely related parties. Our 
conclusion means that one District Court got it right, and 
the other got it wrong. But mandamus is an extraordinary 
remedy. Because the erring District Court’s mistakes were 
not clear or indisputable, we decline to issue the writ. 
I. Background 
Ed Kashi and Bob Krist are professional 
photographers. Kashi resides in Montclair, New Jersey, 
while Krist resides in New Hope, Pennsylvania. To market 
their photographs, Kashi and Krist entered into 
representation agreements with Corbis Corporation, a 
stock photography agency. The agreements provided 
Corbis authority to sub-license the photographers’ works 
to third parties on a non-exclusive, fixed-duration basis. In 
exchange, Kashi and Krist received a percentage of the 
fees negotiated by Corbis. The fees were reported to the 
photographers in periodic royalty statements. The royalty 
statements listed each photograph licensed and the fees 
collected, but did not identify the product in which the 
photograph would be used or specify the scope of the 
license. In addition to the royalty statements, the 
photographers had the right to request an audit once a year 
of Corbis’ records with respect to their images.  
The legal terms of the representation agreements 
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were robust. Exemplar agreements in the record1 include 
assignment of rights to recover, as well as forum selection 
clauses. Paragraph 6, titled “Protection of Accepted 
Images,” reads:  
Corbis, in its sole discretion and without 
obligation to do so, shall have full and 
complete authority to make and settle 
claims or to institute proceedings in 
Corbis’ or your name but at Corbis’ 
expense to recover damages for Accepted 
Images lost or damaged by customers or 
other parties and for the unauthorized use 
of Accepted Images. You shall provide 
reasonable assistance in Corbis’ efforts in 
                                                 
1  The actual representation agreements signed by 
Kashi and Krist are not in the record. However, exemplar 
agreements signed by other photographers and submitted 
as evidence in other actions are included. Counsel for 
Kashi and Krist acknowledged at oral argument that the 
exemplar representation agreements were similar to those 
signed by Kashi and Krist. Oral Arg. 30:38–31:15; see 
also Kashi Resp. 39–40 (conceding that Kashi’s 
representation agreement contained a New York forum 
selection clause). Counsel did not indicate any material 
differences between the photographers’ agreements and 
the exemplar agreements, and also acknowledged that the 
exemplar agreements were available to the District Court 
judges. Oral Arg. 48:21–49:08.  
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connection with such claims or proceedings. 
Any recovery, after payment of all costs and 
expenses including outside attorneys’ fees, 
shall be treated as Revenue and you shall 
receive the appropriate royalty, or 100% in 
the case of lost/damaged images. Following 
your notification, if Corbis declines to 
bring such a claim within sixty (60) days, 
we shall notify you, and you may bring 
actions in your own name at your own 
expense and retain all recoveries. 
Krist App’x 132 (emphasis added). A forum selection 
clause in paragraph 12.3, titled “Law,” reads: 
This Agreement shall be governed by the 
laws of the State of New York, irrespective 
of its conflict of law rules. In any action 
arising out of this Agreement, you consent to 
personal jurisdiction and the exclusive venue 
of the state and federal courts sitting in New 
York City, New York. 
MHE App’x 308, 320, 332, 354; Krist App’x 133.2  
                                                 
2  One of the exemplar representation agreements 
provided in the record prescribes King County, 
Washington, rather than New York, New York, as the 
forum. This fact is inconsequential because neither Kashi 
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Acting upon its authority under the representation 
agreements, Corbis sub-licensed Kashi and Krist’s 
photographs to McGraw-Hill Global Education Holdings 
LLC and McGraw-Hill School Education Holdings LLC 
(collectively “McGraw-Hill” or “MHE”), publishers of 
educational materials for K–12, college, and post-graduate 
students. Corbis utilized a two-step process in sub-
licensing photographs to McGraw-Hill. First, Corbis 
negotiated a series of master agreements known as 
“Preferred Pricing Agreements” (PPAs), which set forth 
volume-based pricing and other terms. Second, Corbis 
issued invoices for all of McGraw-Hill’s licensure 
purchases. The invoices constituted McGraw-Hill’s 
license to use each image. They detailed the scope of the 
license, including limitations “by publication, number of 
copies, distribution area, image size, language, duration 
and/or media (print or electronic).” MHE App’x 165. The 
invoices also listed the price to be paid by McGraw-Hill 
for each image, and included the name of the photographer 
responsible for the work.  
Each invoice incorporated by reference Corbis’ 
standard “Terms and Conditions,” which governed the 
transaction alongside the terms set forth in the PPAs. Both 
the Terms and Conditions and the PPAs included 
mandatory, exclusive forum selection clauses, with nearly 
                                                 
nor Krist allege that their representation agreements 
provided for a forum other than New York, New York. 
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identical language. Titled “Choice of Law / Jurisdiction / 
Attorneys’ Fees,” the clause reads in part: 
Any dispute regarding this Agreement shall 
be governed by the laws of the State of New 
York, and by Titles 15, 17 and 35 of the 
U.S.C., as amended, and the parties agree to 
accept the exclusive jurisdiction of the state 
and federal courts located in New York, New 
York, regardless of conflicts of laws.  
MHE App’x 284 (2014 PPA); cf. id. at 237 (Terms and 
Conditions revised Nov. 19, 2001). The only material 
difference between the forum selection clauses in the 
PPAs and in the Terms and Conditions is that the PPAs 
specify “New York, New York” as the forum, id. at 284, 
while the Terms and Conditions specify “New York, 
USA,” id. at 237.3 
                                                 
3  Any difference in the forum selection clauses 
contained in the PPAs and the Terms and Conditions is not 
discussed by either the parties or the two District Court 
judges. Thus, we will refer to the clauses singly as the 
“Corbis forum selection clause” or “Corbis FSC.” 
The parties do dispute whether the forum selection 
clauses contained in Kashi and Krist’s representation 
agreements are “identical in substance” to those contained 
in the McGraw-Hill agreements. Compare MHE Resp. 3 
n.2 with Krist Reply 17. We consider this argument below 
in Section III.B. 
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In 2016 and 2017, respectively, Krist and Kashi 
each brought a copyright action against McGraw-Hill in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Krist and Kashi both 
allege that McGraw-Hill used their photographs beyond 
the terms of the Corbis licensure agreements, in violation 
of federal copyright law. The photographers allege a range 
of ways in which their photographs were used without 
permission, including exceeding the allowed number of 
publications printed, the geographic distribution area, the 
type of medium, and the time period for publication. In 
each proceeding, McGraw-Hill moved to transfer venue 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). It argued that the disputes 
implicate the Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements, and that 
per the terms of those agreements, the proper venue was 
the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York.  
The Honorable Wendy Beetlestone, presiding over 
the Kashi action, denied the transfer motion. Judge 
Beetlestone reasoned that because Kashi’s claims are 
based purely on copyright law, the action is not a “dispute 
regarding th[e] Agreement[s],” and thus not subject to the 
forum selection clauses contained in the Corbis–McGraw-
Hill agreements. MHE App’x 5. Judge Beetlestone further 
concluded that, absent an applicable forum selection 
clause, McGraw-Hill had not met its burden under 
§ 1404(a) to warrant a transfer.  
The Honorable Legrome Davis, considering a 
parallel motion in the Krist action, reached the opposite 
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conclusion. Judge Davis determined that the dispute is a 
dispute regarding the agreements, because the copyright 
claims depend upon the interpretation of the Corbis–
McGraw-Hill agreements. Judge Davis held that despite 
Krist’s status as a non-signatory, he was subject to the 
forum selection clause as an intended third-party 
beneficiary. Judge Davis also concluded that it was 
foreseeable that Krist would be bound under the Corbis 
forum selection clause. In light of those findings, Judge 
Davis granted the § 1404(a) transfer. 4  
 McGraw-Hill proceeded to file a petition for a writ 
of mandamus, asking this Court to direct a transfer of the 
Kashi action. Krist also petitioned for a writ of mandamus, 
doing so after his motion for reconsideration was denied. 
Krist asks this Court to direct a vacatur of the transfer 
order. The petitions were consolidated and referred to this 
panel. They present a range of doctrinal issues bearing on 
the ultimate question: whether either District Court erred 
in such a manner that mandamus is warranted. Numerous 
other actions implicating the Corbis forum selection clause 
have been adjudicated in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, which have similarly yielded divergent 
results. The petitioners argue that the divergence of views 
speaks to the need for a ruling on mandamus. We agree 
that clarity is needed, yet the reasoned divergence of views 
                                                 
4  Following Judge Davis’ transfer order, but prior to 
the transfer being effectuated, the case was reassigned to 
the Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe.  
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militates against granting the writ. 
II. Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, and Applicable 
Law 
A. Jurisdiction 
Our jurisdiction over this mandamus action falls 
under the All Writs Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651. The 
District Court had federal question jurisdiction over both 
copyright infringement actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and power to transfer those actions under 28 
U.S.C. § 1404. Because we have the power to review a 
district court’s transfer order upon entry of final judgment, 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we may also review such an order on 
mandamus. In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d 
390, 399 (3d Cir. 2017); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 
F.2d 763, 773 (3d Cir. 1984). We exercise plenary review 
over the legal determinations underlying a district court’s 
grant or denial of a § 1404(a) transfer. Sunbelt Corp. v. 
Noble, Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 
1993).  
 Because Judge Davis ordered a transfer, the Krist 
action is no longer pending in the Third Circuit. Yet we 
still retain jurisdiction over transferred cases until the 
transferee court “proceeds” with the action. Howmedica, 
867 F.3d at 400. “[O]nce the transferee court proceeds 
with the transferred case, the decision as to the propriety 
of transfer is to be made in the transferee court.” In re 
United States, 273 F.3d 380, 384 (3d Cir. 2001). However, 
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the term “proceeds” is interpreted as more than, for 
example, the mere entry of a scheduling order. 
Howmedica, 867 F.3d at 400. In the typical case, so long 
as the party seeking mandamus has “acted with sufficient 
dispatch,” we will retain jurisdiction. In re United States, 
273 F.3d at 384. 
For example, in Howmedica the plaintiff waited 
twenty-seven days before seeking mandamus, and the 
transferee court had issued two case management orders 
during that time. 867 F.3d. at 400. In In re United States, 
the government waited thirty-three days to seek 
mandamus, and the transferee court had already issued a 
scheduling order. Id. (citing In re United States, 273 F.3d 
at 382, 384; Order, United States v. Streeval, No. 01-cv-
0084 (M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2001), ECF No. 12). In both 
cases, we concluded that our jurisdiction was proper 
because the petitioners had acted with sufficient dispatch. 
Id. 
Here, the transfer was docketed in the Southern 
District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) on October 24, 2017. The 
operative start date for our purposes is, however, October 
6, 2017, when the case was reassigned to Judge Rufe and 
Krist’s motion for reconsideration was “implicitly 
denied.” Krist Pet’r 5, 10. Krist filed his petition for a writ 
of mandamus in this Court on November 8, 2017. That 
amounts to thirty-three days between the October 6, 2017 
transfer and the November 8, 2017 filing of Krist’s 
mandamus petition. Krist Pet’r 5.  
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As for action in the transferee court, Krist filed a 
letter motion requesting a stay on November 9, 2017. The 
Honorable Loretta Preska in the S.D.N.Y. granted the stay 
on December 4, 2017, after receiving notification that this 
Court had referred the mandamus petition to a merits 
panel. Judge Preska entered no other orders on the 
transferred action. Thus, the transferee court cannot be 
said to have “proceeded” with the action.  
Krist’s thirty-three day delay is the same as has 
previously been deemed “sufficient dispatch.” And 
because the transferee court has not “proceeded” with the 
action, we retain jurisdiction.  
B. Mandamus Standard 
Relief via a writ of mandamus is “extraordinary” 
and is typically appropriate “only upon a showing of (1) a 
clear abuse of discretion or clear error of law; (2) a lack of 
an alternate avenue for adequate relief; and (3) a likelihood 
of irreparable injury.” United States v. Wright, 776 F.3d 
134, 146 (3d Cir. 2015). The writ will issue only if the 
party seeking the writ “meets its burden to demonstrate 
that its right to the writ is clear and indisputable.” Sunbelt 
Corp., 5 F.3d at 30 (quoting Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. 
Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
These mandamus actions arise out of motions to 
transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In the venue 
transfer context, the three-factor mandamus test collapses 
into the first factor. Howmedica, 867 F.3d at 401. That is 
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so because transfer orders “as a class” meet the second and 
third requirements. Id. The second requirement is met 
because “the possibility of an appeal in the transferee 
forum following a final judgment . . . is not an adequate 
alternative to obtain the relief sought.” Sunbelt Corp., 5 
F.3d at 30. The third factor is also met “because an 
erroneous transfer may result in ‘judicially sanctioned 
irreparable procedural injury.’” Howmedica, 867 F.3d at 
401 (quoting Chi., R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378, 
381 (7th Cir. 1954)).  
Despite the elimination of the second and third 
factors, the first factor, “a clear and indisputable ‘abuse of 
discretion or . . . error of law,’” remains a high bar. Id. 
(quoting Wright, 776 F.3d at 146). As the Fifth Circuit has 
explained, “we require more than showing that the court 
misinterpreted the law, misapplied it to the facts, or 
otherwise engaged in an abuse of discretion.” In re Lloyd’s 
Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 2015). 
“[E]ven reversible error by itself is not enough to obtain 
mandamus.” Id. Instead, errors of law must “at least 
approach[] the magnitude of an unauthorized exercise of 
judicial power, or a failure to use that power when there is 
a duty to do so.” Commc’n Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. 
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 932 F.2d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d Cir. 
1988)). This is so because “mandamus must not become a 
means by which the court corrects all potentially 
erroneous orders.” Lloyd’s, 780 F.3d at 290 (citing In re 
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Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 
2008)).  
Moreover, we retain discretion to deny the writ even 
in the face of such errors. Commc’n Workers of Am., 932 
F.2d at 208. We have admonished judges to “proceed both 
carefully and courageously” in exercising their discretion. 
Lusardi, 855 F.2d at 1070.  
C. Venue Transfer Standard  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may 
transfer a civil action to another district where the case 
might have been brought, or to which the parties have 
consented, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses 
and in the interest of justice. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. 
Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879–80 (3d Cir. 1995). 
The § 1404(a) movant bears the burden of 
persuasion. Id. at 879. Factors the court must consider 
include the three enumerated under the statute—
convenience of the parties, convenience of the witnesses, 
and the interests of justice—along with all other relevant 
private and public factors, including the plaintiff’s choice 
of forum and the local interest in deciding local 
controversies close to home. Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. 
v. U.S. District Court, 571 U.S. 49, 62 n.6 (2013) (non-
exhaustive list of factors). Courts consider these factors to 
determine, on balance, whether the litigation would “more 
conveniently proceed and the interests of justice be better 
served by transfer to a different forum.” Jumara, 55 F.3d 
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at 879 (quoting 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & 
Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 
3847 (2d ed. 1986)).  
In 2013, the Supreme Court held that the traditional 
balancing test is modified when a forum selection clause 
applies to a dispute. Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 63. In the 
face of a valid forum selection clause, a district court 
modifies its analysis in three ways. First, no weight is 
given to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Id. Second, the 
court does not consider arguments about the parties’ 
private interests. Id. at 64. Instead, “a district court may 
consider arguments about public-interest factors only.” Id. 
Third, “when a party bound by a forum-selection clause 
flouts its contractual obligation and files suit in a different 
forum, a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry with it 
the original venue’s choice-of-law rules—a factor that in 
some circumstances may affect public-interest 
considerations.” Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
454 U.S. 235, 241, n.6, (1981)). The Supreme Court 
recognized that because the public interest factors—the 
only factors that remain to be balanced—“will rarely 
defeat a transfer motion, the practical result is that forum-
selection clauses should control except in unusual cases.” 
Id. (citation omitted). “In all but the most unusual cases,” 
the parties will be held to their bargained-for choice of 
forum. Id. at 66.  
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D. Applicable Law 
 Federal law controls the question of whether to 
enforce a forum selection clause. Howmedica, 867 F.3d at 
407 n.11 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 
U.S. 22, 32 (1988)); Jumara, 55 F.3d at 877; Phillips v. 
Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“[F]ederal law should be used to determine whether an 
otherwise mandatory and applicable forum clause is 
enforceable . . . because enforcement of forum clauses is 
an essentially procedural issue.”). However, “[t]he 
interpretation of a forum selection clause is an analytically 
distinct concept from the enforceability of that clause.” 
Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 
2017). “The question of the scope of a forum selection 
clause is one of contract interpretation.” John Wyeth & 
Brother Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1073 
(3d Cir. 1997). Our case law directs us to use state law to 
determine the scope of a forum selection clause—that is, 
“‘whether the claims and parties involved in the suit are 
subject’ to the clause.”  Collins, 874 F.3d at 180 
(quoting Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 
(2d Cir. 2014)). State law, therefore, typically governs 
whether the clause covers a particular claim, as well as 
whether the clause applies to a non-signatory as an 
intended beneficiary or closely related party. Collins, 874 
F.3d at 183–85 (applying Texas law to determine whether 
plaintiff’s New Jersey Wage Payment Law claim fell 
within the scope of forum selection clause); E.I. DuPont 
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de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 196–98 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(applying Delaware law to determine whether party was 
third-party beneficiary or closely related); Martinez, 740 
F.3d at 221–24 (explaining that federal law should not be 
used to determine the scope of a forum selection clause in 
a federal-question case); cf. Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1074 
(acknowledging applicability of English law but applying 
“general contract law principles” in light of the parties’ 
briefing).  
Parties are generally free to specify which law 
governs a contract’s interpretation, and may agree to 
modify the choice specified in the contract. See Adams v. 
Raintree Vacation Exch., LLC, 702 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 
2012). The Corbis forum selection clause includes a 
choice of law provision specifying the laws of the State of 
New York. See MHE App’x 284 (2014 PPA). Yet for 
purposes of determining whether the claims are subject to 
the clause, the parties cite federal case law. For purposes 
of determining whether the clause can be applied to Kashi 
and Krist, the photographers cite New York law and 
federal case law governing third party beneficiaries, and 
only federal case law as to the closely related parties 
doctrine. McGraw-Hill cites only federal case law. Of 
course, McGraw-Hill seeks to enforce an agreement 
containing a New York choice of law clause and thus can 
hardly object to the invocation of New York law in 
analyzing whether Kashi and Krist are intended 
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beneficiaries.  See Collins, 874 F.3d 180–81.  In these 
circumstances—notwithstanding our usual approach of 
applying state law to both the claim and party components 
of the question of scope—as the parties agree in their 
briefing about the law governing two of the three 
components, we will accept the parties’ stipulation.  See 
Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1074; Adams v. Raintree Vacation 
Exch., LLC, 702 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 2012); Phillips, 
494 F.3d at 386. We will therefore apply federal law to 
evaluate whether the clause covers the claims, New York 
law to assess whether the photographers should be bound 
by the clause as intended beneficiaries, and federal law in 
evaluating whether Kashi and Krist are closely related 
parties. 
Finally, if we determine that the disputes fall within 
the scope of the forum selection clause and that the clause 
applies to the non-signatory photographers, we will look 
to this Court’s precedent to determine whether we would 
enforce the clause for purposes of the § 1404(a) motions.  
III. Analysis 
There are four substantive issues that bear on 
whether the forum selection clause applies to the 
photographers and whether transfer was appropriate. First, 
we must consider whether Kashi and Krist are bound by 
the terms of the agreements between McGraw-Hill and 
Corbis—agreements neither Kashi nor Krist signed. 
Under traditional principles of contract law, non-
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signatories may be bound by a forum selection clause if 
they are intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract, 
or if they are closely related parties. See DuPont, 269 F.3d 
at 194–99 (considering doctrines in the context of an 
arbitration clause); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practice Litig. All Agent Actions, 133 F.3d 225, 229 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (“As this court has previously recognized, ‘a 
variety of nonsignatories of arbitration agreements have 
been held to be bound by such agreements under ordinary 
common law contract and agency principles.’”) (quoting 
Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 752 F.2d 
923, 938 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted), overruled on 
other grounds by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1112 (3d Cir. 1993)); Dayhoff 
Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1298 n.9 (3d Cir. 
1996) (noting that arbitration agreements are “a 
specialized kind of forum-selection clause”) (quoting 
Scherk v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)). 
Second, our cases and those of other circuits establish that 
we will not enforce a forum selection clause against a non-
signatory unless such enforcement was foreseeable to the 
non-signatory. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman 
Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 1983), 
overruled on other grounds by Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 
490 U.S. 495 (1989); Howmedica, 867 F.3d at 407 n.13 
(listing cases). Third, the dispute itself must fall within the 
scope of the forum selection clause. The parties do not 
invoke New York substantive law on this point. Instead, 
the parties make much of whether, under this Court’s 
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precedent, any asserted license is part of the plaintiffs’ 
prima facie case or merely a defense. Fourth, we consider 
whether the Atlantic Marine-modification to the § 1404(a) 
analysis applies when non-signatories are bound by a 
forum selection clause.  
A. Are Kashi and Krist bound by the forum selection 
clause? 
 Contrary to the District Court’s ruling in the Krist 
action, we conclude that the photographers were not 
intended third-party beneficiaries of the agreements 
between McGraw-Hill and Corbis. Nor are they bound 
under the closely related parties doctrine. The 
photographers therefore are not subject to the forum 
selection clause. 
i. The photographers are not intended third-party 
beneficiaries. 
A non-signatory may be bound by a contractual 
forum selection clause if he is an intended third-party 
beneficiary to the contract. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 195 
(citing Coastal Steel Corp., 709 F.2d at 202–04). The New 
York Court of Appeals has adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts for determining third-party 
beneficiary status. Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of 
Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Fourth 
Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 485 
N.E.2d 208, 212 (N.Y. 1985)). As the Restatement 
explains: 
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(1) Unless otherwise agreed between 
promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a 
promise is an intended beneficiary if 
recognition of a right to performance in the 
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the 
intention of the parties and either 
(a) the performance of the promise will 
satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay 
money to the beneficiary; or 
(b) the circumstances indicate that the 
promisee intends to give the beneficiary the 
benefit of the promised performance. 
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary 
who is not an intended beneficiary. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981) 
(“Restatement”). 
The touchstone is the parties’ intent, primarily as 
reflected in the language of their contract: “The intention 
to benefit the third party must appear from the four corners 
of the instrument . . . [and] must be that of both parties to 
the . . . contract.” Stainless, Inc. v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 
69 A.D.2d 27, 33–34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), aff’d, 406 
N.E.2d 490 (N.Y. 1980). “A court in determining the 
parties’ intention should consider the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction as well as the actual language 
of the contract.” Subaru Distribs. Corp., 425 F.3d at 124 
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(quoting Restatement § 302, Reporter’s Note cmt. a). As 
an example, “[a] contractual requirement that the promisor 
render performance directly to the third party shows an 
intent to benefit the third party.” Id. (emphasis added). As 
the First Circuit has explained: “The structure of the 
performance required under the particular contract often 
provides the critical indicum [sic] of intent in third party 
beneficiary cases. Unless the performance required by the 
contract will directly benefit the would-be intended 
beneficiary, he is at best an incidental beneficiary.” Pub. 
Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. Hudson Light & Power 
Dep’t, 938 F.2d 338, 342 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 McGraw-Hill makes two arguments for why the 
photographers are intended beneficiaries of its agreements 
with Corbis. First and foremost, McGraw-Hill argues that 
the photographers benefit directly from the agreements. 
Second, it argues that the listing of the photographers’ 
names on the Corbis invoices demonstrates McGraw-
Hill’s and Corbis’ intent to benefit the photographers.  
 We reject McGraw-Hill’s first argument out-of-
hand. The photographers were not entitled to any 
compensation as a direct result of the Corbis–McGraw-
Hill agreements. The photographers receive compensation 
only by operation of the separate representation 
agreements they entered into with Corbis. McGraw-Hill 
points to no provision of the PPAs or invoices that directly 
entitles either photographer to anything.  
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Moreover, McGraw-Hill’s “direct” beneficiary 
theory is contrary to the examples provided in the 
Restatement. As an illustration from the Restatement 
explains: “B contracts with A to buy a new car 
manufactured by C. C is an incidental beneficiary, even 
though the promise can only be performed if money is paid 
to C.” Restatement cmt. e. ills. 17. The manufacturer in 
that illustration is not a party to the sale, and it is not owed 
performance under the terms of the sale. Rather, it is owed 
performance under the terms of its contract with the 
dealer. Likewise here, the photographers are incidental 
beneficiaries of the Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements; 
they are owed compensation only by virtue of their own 
contracts with Corbis.  
 Judge Davis reasoned that the limitations contained 
in agreements between McGraw-Hill and Corbis directly 
benefit the photographers. He explained that Krist benefits 
from the limitations on the use of the copyrighted material, 
including limitations on the size of the images, numbers of 
copies, and duration of use. Krist App’x 375. Judge Davis 
stated that “[p]rovisions limiting the actions of a 
contracting party that are intended to benefit a third party 
make the third party an intended beneficiary.” Id. For this 
proposition, Judge Davis cited an illustration from the 
Restatement. In it, a downstream landowner is an intended 
beneficiary of a contract between an operator of a fertilizer 
plant and a municipal sewer authority because the contract 
includes a term intended to prevent harm to that 
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landowner, namely, a term requiring the removal of 
specified types of waste from the fertilizer plant’s 
wastewater. Id. (citing Restatement cmt. d. ills. 10). We 
cannot agree. Krist is the exclusive owner of the rights to 
reproduce, distribute, and display the photographs by 
virtue of the Copyright Act. McGraw-Hill is an infringer 
to the extent it exceeds any license that Krist or a sub-
licensor granted it. The limitations in the license are not a 
contractual benefit to Krist, because his right to those 
limitations arises from the Copyright Act.  
 Judge Davis also reasoned that the invoices’ 
“specific listing of the copyright holder for each licensed 
image evidences the intent of the parties to benefit the 
copyright holders.” Krist App’x 376. Kashi and Krist do 
not offer a strong rebuttal to this reasoning. At oral 
argument, counsel for the photographers suggested that 
the identification of the photographers was for the sole 
purpose of enabling the publisher to list a photo credit, as 
was required for purposes of the publication. Oral Arg. 
22:33–22:50. Overall, Judge Davis did not place strong 
emphasis on this point, and the invoices alone do not 
provide sufficient evidence of an intent to bestow 
contractual rights or benefits on the photographers. For 
example, in one of the illustrations from the Restatement 
quoted above, although the name of the car manufacturer 
will likely be listed on the contract between the buyer and 
seller, the manufacturer is still not an intended beneficiary 
of that contract.  
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 Finally, the photographers argue that McGraw-Hill 
should be estopped from asserting an intended third-party 
beneficiary argument because of a position it took in prior 
litigation over the Corbis agreements. McGraw-Hill 
argues vigorously against estoppel. In light of our 
conclusion that the photographers are not intended third-
party beneficiaries, we need not consider the application 
of estoppel. We do, however, take note of McGraw-Hill’s 
previous arguments.  
In an earlier case in the Southern District of New 
York, a photographer in privity with Corbis attempted to 
assert rights under the Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements, 
including a provision that entitled Corbis to bill the 
publisher “ten (10) times the normal license fee for any 
unauthorized use.”5 Defending against the photographer’s 
                                                 
5  Lefkowitz v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, 
LLC, 23 F. Supp. 3d 344, 349, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(“Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim seeks to enforce, in 
his own right, the Corbis Agreements that Plaintiff alleges 
govern the relationship between Corbis and [McGraw-
Hill]. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to recover under the Ten 
Times Provision in those contracts.”).  
The “Ten Times Provision” is contained within a 
paragraph of the Corbis Terms and Conditions titled 
“Unauthorized Use.” It reads:  
Without limitation, Images may not be 
utilized as a trademark or service mark, or for 
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right to bring an action under the contract to which it was 
a non-signatory, McGraw-Hill argued that the 
photographers were not intended third-party beneficiaries. 
In its briefing on a motion to dismiss, McGraw-Hill 
                                                 
any pornographic use, unlawful purpose or 
use, or to defame any person, or to violate any 
person’s right of privacy or publicity, or to 
infringe upon any copyright, trade name, 
trademark, or service mark of any person or 
entity. Unauthorized use of these Images 
constitutes copyright infringement and 
shall entitle Corbis to exercise all rights 
and remedies under applicable copyright 
law, including an injunction preventing 
further use and monetary damages against all 
users and beneficiaries of the use of such 
Images. Corbis in its sole discretion 
reserves the right to bill you (and you 
hereby agree to pay) ten (10) times the 
normal license fee for any unauthorized 
use, in addition to any other fees, damages, 
or penalties Corbis may be entitled to under 
this Agreement or applicable law. The 
foregoing is not a limiting statement of 
Corbis’ rights or remedies in connection with 
any unauthorized use. 
MHE App’x 236; Krist App’x 145 (emphasis added).  
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cogently summarized the intended third-party beneficiary 
doctrine, then argued that the Corbis Terms and 
Conditions “identify as the parties to their arrangements 
only MHE and Corbis, and they contain both anti-
assignment and integration clauses and do not identify any 
third party in their choice of forum provisions.” Krist 
App’x 439 (emphasis added). McGraw-Hill argued that 
this “strongly suggest[s] that the two parties to the contract 
intended the contract to concern and to benefit only 
themselves.” Id. at 439–40 (quoting Subaru Distribs. 
Corp., 425 F.3d at 125). We consider this reasoning 
compelling, much more so than the arguments in favor of 
contractual third-party beneficiary status that McGraw-
Hill has raised in these cases. We also note that while 
McGraw-Hill made a full-throated explication of the 
intended third-party beneficiary doctrine in the Lefkowitz 
matter—in order to argue against the doctrine’s 
application—McGraw-Hill only feebly invoked the 
doctrine before the District Court in the cases before us. 
Indeed, as McGraw-Hill concedes in a supplemental letter 
brief, the term “intended beneficiary” did not appear in 
their opening briefs filed in the District Court.  
ii. The photographers are not closely related parties. 
McGraw-Hill invokes another doctrine to argue that 
the photographers should be bound as non-signatories to 
the Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements: the closely related 
Case: 17-2826     Document: 003113092002     Page: 28      Date Filed: 11/21/2018
 29 
 
parties doctrine.6 The closely related parties doctrine is a 
form of equitable estoppel. This Court recognized in 
                                                 
6  There is some ambiguity in our cases concerning 
whether we even recognize the closely related parties 
doctrine. In Dayhoff, the court declined to allow non-
signatories to invoke an arbitration agreement. 86 F.3d at 
1296. Howmedica relied on Dayhoff in declining to apply 
the doctrine. Howmedica, 867 F.3d at 407 (“We have held, 
however, that a forum-selection clause ‘can be enforced 
only by the signator[y] to [the] agreement[ ].’”) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Dayhoff, 86 F.3d at 1293–
97)). The photographers read Howmedica as repudiating 
the closely related parties doctrine writ large. Kashi Resp. 
33–34; Krist Pet’r 17. But Howmedica did not foreclose 
the doctrine entirely and, indeed, proceeded to analyze 
whether the defendants there would constitute “closely 
related parties” if the doctrine were applicable. See 867 
F.3d at 407 n.13. Moreover, cases decided before 
Howmedica did not read Dayhoff as setting forth such a 
bright-line rule. See Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. 
Moonmouth Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(affirming a district court’s application of the closely 
related doctrine, permitting the non-signatory to enforce a 
forum selection clause against a signatory); DuPont, 269 
F.3d at 199 (“We have never applied an equitable estoppel 
theory to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration clause 
although there appears to be no reason why, in an 
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DuPont that it had “never applied an equitable estoppel 
theory to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration clause 
although there appears to be no reason why, in an 
appropriate case, we would refrain from doing so.” 269 
F.3d at 199.  
“In determining whether a non-signatory is closely 
related to a contract, courts consider the non-signatory’s 
ownership of the signatory, its involvement in the 
negotiations, the relationship between the two parties and 
whether the non-signatory received a direct benefit from 
the agreement.” Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Moonmouth 
Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2015) (permitting non-
                                                 
appropriate case, we would refrain from doing so.”). The 
DuPont Court described Dayhoff in a parenthetical as 
holding that “non-signatories could not enforce arbitration 
clause against signatory where no exception applied, but 
successor to signatory could compel arbitration.” 269 F.3d 
at 195 (emphasis added) (citing Dayhoff, 86 F.3d at 1294–
96); see also Adams v. Raintree Vacation Exch., LLC, 
702 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 2012) (characterizing 
Dayhoff’s reluctance to bind non-signatories as 
consequence of considerations unique to arbitration 
agreements, namely surrendering one’s right to 
adjudication before a court). And we have otherwise 
suggested that non-signatories may be bound to 
contractual terms under traditional principles of contract 
and agency law. In re Prudential, 133 F.3d at 229.  
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signatory to enforce forum selection clause against 
signatory under the closely related parties doctrine).  
Here, it is clear that the photographers are not in an 
ownership or subsidiary relationship with Corbis. The 
record establishes only that they were in privity with 
Corbis for the purpose of licensing artwork. Moreover, 
there is no evidence that the photographers were involved 
in contract negotiations between Corbis and McGraw-
Hill. Finally, the photographers did not, in any natural 
reading of the word, receive a “direct” benefit from the 
Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements. Accordingly, there is 
precious little basis for applying the closely related parties 
doctrine.  
iii. Despite error, mandamus is not warranted on this 
issue alone. 
 Having concluded that the District Court in Krist 
erred in its conclusion that Krist has intended third-party 
beneficiary status and in transferring his case on the basis 
that the forum selection clause applied to him, we must 
next consider whether this error was a “clear and 
indisputable abuse of discretion or . . . error of law.” 
Howmedica, 867 F.3d at 401. We do not find Judge Davis’ 
error here so clear as to meet that standard. Judge Davis 
was correct that the photographers were identified in each 
invoice. And while we disagree with his conclusion that 
the invoices rendered Krist a direct beneficiary, the result, 
as it pertains to this conclusion, cannot be said to 
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“approach[] the magnitude of an unauthorized exercise of 
judicial power.” Commc’n Workers of Am., 932 F.2d at 
208. Even if we were to conclude that this error did meet 
that standard, we retain discretion over whether to grant 
the writ. Id. We discern no basis for exercising that 
discretion. 
Many photographers have sought to invoke the 
terms of the Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements in order to 
pursue breach of contract claims against McGraw-Hill. 
While arguments raised in other cases do not bind us, we 
do consider the larger jurisprudential landscape in the 
context of mandamus. We acknowledge the existence of a 
sharp split in the decisions of judges in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania and within the District of New Jersey on 
the question of the applicability of the forum selection 
clause at issue here. Some of those decisions have 
concluded that photographers were intended beneficiaries 
of the Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements, or that the 
photographers were so closely related to those agreements 
that enforcement of the forum selection clause was 
justified.7 Having reviewed the analysis in the other cases 
                                                 
7  Steinmetz v. Scholastic Inc., No. 16-cv-3583, 2017 
WL 4082681, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2017) (Hayden, J.) 
(considering Corbis to be plaintiff’s agent and applying 
closely related parties doctrine); Yamashita v. Scholastic 
Inc., No. 16-cv-3839, 2016 WL 6897781, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 21, 2016) (Chesler, J.) (holding that Corbis was 
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plaintiff’s agent and that the action was one “regarding” 
the contract because it “arises from a dispute over whether 
Scholastic used Plaintiff’s photographs outside the terms 
of the licenses obtained under the [PPAs]”); Keller v. 
McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holding, LLC, No. 16-cv-1778, 
2016 WL 4035613, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2016) 
(Slomsky, J.) (“Plaintiff is a non-signatory third-party who 
is bound by the forum-selection clause because of his 
underlying contractual relationship with [Corbis].”). But 
see Krist v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 509, 511–
14 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (McHugh, J.) (finding that Corbis was 
not plaintiff’s agent and that plaintiff cannot be bound by 
Corbis FSC where not signatory to contract and not 
seeking to invoke contract; holding that closely related 
doctrine applies only where non-signatory defendants had 
involvement with contract or sought to enforce it); Krist v. 
Scholastic, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 804, 809–11 (E.D. Pa. 
2017) (Rufe, J.) (holding that the Corbis FSC does not 
govern the copyright claim, and holding that the FSC does 
not bind plaintiff as non-party because he is not the 
intended beneficiary, and declining to apply closely 
related doctrine); Steinmetz v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. 
Holdings, LLC, 220 F. Supp. 3d 596, 604 (E.D. Pa. 2016) 
(Robreno, J.) (holding that Corbis FSC’s application to 
“[a]ny dispute regarding this agreement” does not broadly 
apply to “any type of intellectual property dispute that 
conceivably could arise between Defendants and the 
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and the arguments raised in those actions, we cannot 
conclude that the error committed by Judge Davis is clear 
and indisputable.  
Even so, we proceed to analyze other issues 
addressed by the two District Court judges, because a clear 
and indisputable error on any determination necessary for 
transfer might warrant mandamus.  
B. Was enforcement foreseeable? 
Foreseeability is a prerequisite to applying the 
closely related parties doctrine. That is, before binding a 
non-signatory as a closely related party, we require a 
finding that enforcement of the clause by or against the 
non-signatory would be foreseeable. See Howmedica, 867 
F.3d at 407 n.13; Magi XXI, Inc. v. Stato della Citta del 
Vaticano, 714 F.3d 714, 723 (2d Cir. 2013) Lipcon v. 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1299 
(11th Cir. 1998); Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 999 F.2d 206, 
209 (7th Cir. 1993). Likewise, we require a foreseeability 
finding when enforcing a forum selection clause against 
                                                 
owner of any intellectual property that Defendants might 
license from Corbis”); Eastcott v. McGraw-Hill Global 
Educ. Holdings, LLC, No. 16-cv-904, 2016 WL 3959076, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2016) (McHugh, J.) (rejecting 
closely related argument on grounds that only “19 of the 
274 total claims or less than 7% to be exact” implicate the 
agreement with the Corbis FSC). 
 
Case: 17-2826     Document: 003113092002     Page: 34      Date Filed: 11/21/2018
 35 
 
an intended beneficiary. In Coastal Steel, we held that the 
plaintiff could not avoid a forum selection clause on 
account of its third-party beneficiary status. 709 F.2d at 
203. We reasoned: 
Coastal chose to do business with Farmer 
Norton, an English firm, knowing that 
Farmer Norton would be acquiring 
components from other English 
manufacturers. Thus it was perfectly 
foreseeable that Coastal would be a third-
party beneficiary of an English contract, and 
that such a contract would provide for 
litigation in an English court. 
Id. As the quoted language indicates, Coastal Steel 
recognized not only that it was foreseeable that the non-
signatory would be a third-party beneficiary, or that the 
contract would contain a forum selection clause, but also 
that the forum selection clause would provide for a 
specific forum convenient to the signatory.  
 Judge Davis recognized the foreseeability 
requirement in Krist. He first concluded that it was 
foreseeable to Krist that Corbis would contract with 
licensees, and that Krist may be a third-party beneficiary 
to those agreements. Krist App’x 377. This much is 
obvious: Krist entered into an agreement with Corbis for 
the very purpose of having Corbis sub-license his 
photographs. And because Krist was owed monetary 
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compensation under his agreement with Corbis, it was 
foreseeable that he may have been deemed an intended 
beneficiary of those agreements. It is also foreseeable that 
Corbis’ contracts with licensees would contain forum 
selection clauses. After all, the photographers’ own 
contracts with Corbis contained such clauses, and as the 
District Court reasoned, they are quite common. Id. (citing 
secondary source material). But the District Court made 
no finding that Krist could have foreseen that those clauses 
would specify New York, New York as a forum. While the 
District Court noted that Corbis’ standard Terms and 
Conditions were published on Corbis’ webpage, the 
District Court made no finding that Krist had ever visited 
the webpage or had seen an explicit reference to those 
terms and conditions. The fact that it was possible for Krist 
to access the Terms and Conditions on the website does 
not establish that it was foreseeable that he would be 
subject to those terms as a third-party beneficiary. See 
James v. Glob. TelLink Corp, 852 F.3d 262, 267–68 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (publication of terms of use on website is not 
alone sufficient to bind). As the photographers argue, there 
is “no evidence these Terms & Conditions or the FSC 
therein were ever ‘reasonably communicated’ or 
otherwise made known to Kashi. Although Kashi received 
royalty statements from Corbis that provided limited 
information, Kashi did not receive copies of the Invoices 
that Corbis issued to MHE.” Kashi Resp. 7.  
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A foreseeability finding in the context of forum 
selection clauses must have some evidentiary basis, other 
than pure speculation, that the party sought to be bound 
had an awareness of the clause, its contents, and that it 
might be defensively invoked. Krist argues for a higher 
bar. He argues that foreseeability requires a finding that 
the clause and its contents had been “reasonably 
communicated” to the party against whom enforcement is 
sought. Krist Pet’r 19 (citing Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 
494 F.3d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 2007)). But our case law, 
notably Coastal Steel, did not set such a high bar, and we 
decline to raise that bar today. What Coastal Steel does 
require is that the actual forum be foreseeable, and that 
there be some evidentiary basis for such a finding. 
In light of this standard, we conclude that Judge 
Davis’ foreseeability finding was insufficient. The online 
Terms and Conditions cannot suffice, and Judge Davis 
made no finding as to the foreseeability of a specific 
forum. Yet we cannot say, on the record before us, that this 
error was so clear as to warrant mandamus. Indeed, there 
was other evidence in the record on which Judge Davis 
could have relied to bolster his foreseeability finding: 
namely the exemplar representation agreements. Krist has 
not refuted—and Kashi has conceded—that the 
photographers’ representation agreements with Corbis 
contained a forum selection clause that specified New 
York, New York. Oral Arg. 30:38–31:15, 48:21–49:08; 
Kashi Resp. 39–40 (conceding that Kashi’s representation 
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agreement contained a New York forum selection clause). 
At the very least, these clauses provide evidentiary support 
for a finding that enforcement of a New York, New York 
forum selection clause was foreseeable—the 
photographers were aware that Corbis preferred that 
forum. Because he had this evidence before him, Judge 
Davis’ finding was not clear and indisputable error.  
C. Do the copyright claims fall within the scope of the 
Corbis FSC? 
Judge Davis held that the copyright claims depend 
upon the licenses because unauthorized use is part of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case in the copyright context. The 
Second Circuit employs this approach when only the 
scope of the license is at issue. Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 
68 F.3d 621, 631 (2d Cir. 1995). In other words, where the 
plaintiff concedes the existence of a license, the burden 
may fall on the plaintiff, in the first instance, to 
demonstrate that the scope was exceeded. We have yet to 
consider that doctrine and have no cause to consider it 
today. Indeed, the plaintiffs doggedly refuse to concede 
the existence of licenses, even when pressed at oral 
argument. Oral Arg. 27:36–29:30. But that refusal to 
concede is not the reason we decline to adopt the Bourne 
rule. Rather, we recognize that on the facts of the cases 
before us, we could not hold plaintiffs to such a prima 
facie burden.  
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The licenses obtained by McGraw-Hill were not 
granted by the photographers directly but by Corbis as a 
sub-licensor. And the royalty statements received by the 
photographers lacked specific detail as to the scope of each 
license granted. Kashi Resp. 7, 37 (citing Kashi Supp. 
App’x 1). As such, it stands to reason that the 
photographers may not be aware of each license issued, or 
the scope of each license. Because they were not 
themselves directly privy to those licenses, we cannot 
expect them to plead unauthorized use as part of a prima 
facie case. As the Seventh Circuit recognized when 
considering this very issue, “ʻproving a negative is a 
challenge in any context,’ and if there is evidence of a 
license, it is most likely to be in the possession of the 
purported licensee.” Muhammad-Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 
832 F.3d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311 (2004)).  
The Seventh Circuit took the opportunity in 
Muhammad-Ali to clarify the elements of a prima facie 
claim for copyright infringement. We do the same here. 
Both McGraw-Hill’s arguments and Judge Davis’ opinion 
cite to Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace 
Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002), for the 
elements of a copyright infringement claim. According to 
that precedential opinion: “To establish a claim of 
copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish: (1) 
ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized 
copying of original elements of the plaintiff’s work.” Id. 
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at 206. As an initial matter, that statement appears to be 
dictum—it is a proposition not essential to the 
determination of the case. Further, Dun & Bradstreet’s 
inclusion of “unauthorized” as part of the second element 
appears to be an error. The precedent Dun & Bradstreet 
cites as support of the listed elements, Whelan Assocs., 
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d 
Cir. 1986), and Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir. 1993), do not include the 
term “unauthorized” in their listing of the second element. 
Nor has the Supreme Court held that unauthorized 
copying is the second element of a copyright claim. Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 
(1991) (“To establish infringement, two elements must be 
proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) 
copying of constituent elements of the work that are 
original.”). We can only conclude that use of the word 
“unauthorized” was erroneous. Because Whelan predated 
Dun & Bradstreet, its explication of the elements controls. 
The traditions of this Court dictate that a panel decision 
may not overrule the holding of a previous panel. Reilly v. 
City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017), as 
amended (June 26, 2017) (citing Internal Operating 
Procedures of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals § 9.1); 
United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 803 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(same).  
Having determined that the license is not part of the 
photographers’ prima facie case, we turn to the text of the 
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forum selection clause. We interpret a forum selection 
clause in accordance with its plain meaning. See Reading 
Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 99 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (citing Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 
2011); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 544 F.3d 
229, 243 (3d Cir. 2008); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 202 (1981)). The clause in the Corbis 
agreements reads: 
Any dispute regarding this Agreement shall 
be governed by the laws of the State of New 
York, and by Titles 15, 17 and 35 of the 
U.S.C., as amended, and the parties agree to 
accept the exclusive jurisdiction of the state 
and federal courts located in New York, New 
York, regardless of conflicts of laws.  
MHE App’x 284 (2014 PPA). Of immediate significance 
is use of the noun “dispute,” which is used as opposed to, 
for example, “claim.” Under Wyeth, this Court construes 
the word “dispute” as being broader than “claim.” 119 
F.3d at 1074. The Seventh Circuit has held likewise, 
explaining that “the forum selection clause does not apply 
just to the litigation of claims that arise out of, concern, 
etc., the contract; it applies to the litigation of disputes that 
arise out of, concern, etc., the contract.” Abbott Labs. v. 
Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 2007). 
The Second Circuit disagrees. In Phillips, 494 F.3d at 391, 
the forum selection clause applied not just to “claims” but 
Case: 17-2826     Document: 003113092002     Page: 41      Date Filed: 11/21/2018
 42 
 
to “proceedings.” But the Court held that “reference to 
proceedings” did not require it “to take into consideration 
the source of rights or duties asserted on defense.” Id. 
Unlike the Second Circuit, we hold that the word 
“disputes” allows the contract to be implicated by way of 
an affirmative defense.  
But we must also consider the second word: the 
preposition “regarding.” In Wyeth the forum selection 
clause applied to “any dispute arising under or out of or in 
relation to this Agreement.” 119 F.3d at 1072. The Court 
noted that “arising in relation to” is broader than “arising 
under.” Id. at 1075. It explained: 
The ordinary meaning of the phrase “arising 
in relation to” is simple. To say that a dispute 
“arise[s] . . . in relation to” the 1990 
Agreement is to say that the origin of the 
dispute is related to that agreement, i.e., that 
the origin of the dispute has some “logical or 
causal connection” to the 1990 Agreement. 
Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, 1916 (1971). 
Wyeth, 119 F.3d at 1074. See also Flanagan v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E. 2d 345, 350 (N.Y. 1986) 
(holding that “respecting,” which is defined as “ʻwith 
regard or relation to: regarding, concerning,’” has a 
broader connotation than “arising out of”) (quoting 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 1934).  
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Second, the preposition “regarding” is used rather 
than the phrase “arising under,” “arising out of,” or 
“arising in relation to.” The ordinary meaning of 
“regarding” mirrors the latter, or “in relation to.” 
“Regarding” is defined as “[i]n reference or relation to; 
about, concerning.” Oxford English Dictionary (“OED”), 
Third Edition, December 2009; i.e., “with respect to; 
concerning.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 
11th ed. The preposition “concerning” is likewise defined 
as “[a]s regards; as relates to.” OED, Third Edition, 
September 2015.  
“Regarding” may thus be equated with “relates to,” 
a phrase Wyeth defines as having some “logical or causal 
connection.” 119 F.3d at 1074. Here, the disputes have a 
logical or causal connection to the agreements, at least for 
the majority of the claims. As Krist’s Complaint suggests, 
McGraw-Hill obtained access to the photographs through 
its licensure agreements with Corbis. Krist App’x 6 (Krist 
Complaint ¶ 10). Those licenses were for limited use, yet 
McGraw-Hill “print[ed] or distribut[ed] more copies of the 
[p]hotographs than authorized.” Id. at 7 (Krist Complaint 
¶¶ 11–13). Kashi’s Complaint makes the same allegations. 
MHE App’x 164–65 (Kashi Complaint ¶¶ 9–12). These 
allegations establish a logical and causal connection 
between the Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements and the 
copyright infringement actions. It may be said that the 
“dispute” here is whether McGraw-Hill violated the 
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plaintiffs’ copyrights by exceeding the scope of its 
licenses.  
As an additional point, the forum selection clause 
specifies the federal copyright statutes as a source of law: 
“Any dispute regarding this Agreement shall be governed 
by the laws of the State of New York, and by Titles 15, 17 
and 35 of the U.S.C., as amended . . . .” MHE App’x 284 
(emphasis added). The reference to copyright law suggests 
that the clause was intended to encompass such disputes. 
See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 13-cv-
1662, 2013 WL 4079923, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2013) 
(Baylson, J.) (“[T]he forum selection clause specifically 
envisions that ‘any dispute regarding this Agreement’ 
includes copyright infringement claims because the clause 
expressly states that disputes shall be governed by, inter 
alia, Title 17 of the United States Code (i.e., the title of the 
Code that governs copyright claims).”). 
Based on this Court’s precedent, which the parties 
cite for interpretation of the clause, we hold that the 
photographers’ copyright actions are “disputes regarding” 
the Corbis–McGraw-Hill agreements because the face of 
the complaints contemplate that licenses existed, and the 
language of the forum selection clause is broad enough to 
encompass actions in which the agreements are raised as 
an affirmative defense. See MHE App’x 164 (Complaint 
¶¶ 8–9) (reference to invoices issued by Corbis); Krist 
App’x 6 (Complaint ¶ 10) (same).  
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We also note our case law which suggests that to 
bind non-signatories to a forum selection clause, the claim 
must arise in relation to the contract. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 
197–98. Given the unique nature of copyright claims, we 
recognize that we should not permit a party to avoid a 
forum selection clause simply by pleading non-contract 
claims. See Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 203 (“[W]here the 
relationship between the parties is contractual, the 
pleading of alternative non-contractual theories of liability 
should not prevent enforcement of such a bargain.”); 
Crescent Int’l, Inc. v. Avatar Cmtys., Inc., 857 F.2d 943, 
944–45 (3d Cir. 1988) (same). So where the copyright 
holder is an intended third-party beneficiary or closely 
related party and the natural language of the forum 
selection clause is broad enough to cover a copyright 
claim, we would ordinarily bind the non-signatory. 
In conclusion, Judge Davis reached the correct 
result about the scope of the forum selection clause, but 
did so, in part, for the wrong reason. Because of the 
mistaken placement of a word in Dun & Bradstreet, Judge 
Davis was incorrect in reasoning that a copyright claim 
“depends on” the agreements by virtue of the pleading 
standard. However, Judge Davis was correct in concluding 
that the text of the forum selection clause is broad enough 
to encompass actions pleaded only under the Copyright 
Act. That conclusion would be consequential if the 
photographers were signatories to the Corbis forum 
selection clause, were intended third-party beneficiaries, 
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or were closely related parties. But because the 
photographers are none of those things, the scope of the 
forum selection clause is of little consequence.8 Indeed, 
the only consequence for our purposes is to determine that 
Judge Davis’ conclusion regarding the scope of the forum 
selection clause is not a basis for granting mandamus 
relief. 
D. The reach of Atlantic Marine  
The final doctrinal question raised by these actions 
is distinct. Apart from his determinations regarding the 
applicability of the forum selection clause, did Judge 
Davis err in conducting his § 1404(a) transfer analysis? 9 
Krist argues that Judge Davis so erred by applying Atlantic 
Marine and that our Howmedica decision required him to 
consider Krist’s choice of forum and private interests. We 
                                                 
8  Judge Beetlestone incorrectly concluded that 
Kashi’s copyright claims fell outside the scope of the 
forum selection clause. MHE App’x 4–6. But Judge 
Beetlestone’s ultimate conclusion—that the clause was 
not enforceable against Kashi—was correct. 
 
9  Judge Beetlestone undertook a traditional § 1404(a) 
analysis and found that transfer was not justified. MHE 
App’x 4–6. McGraw-Hill does not argue that the judge’s 
traditional § 1404(a) analysis was faulty, and thus we need 
not evaluate it. 
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conclude that no such error occurred and Howmedica did 
not so require. 
 As discussed in Section II.C., Atlantic Marine 
modified the traditional § 1404(a) balancing test in 
scenarios where a forum selection clause binds all parties. 
The Court collapsed the § 1404(a) analysis into 
consideration of one factor: the public interest. 571 U.S. at 
64.  
 The parties in Atlantic Marine were all signatories 
to the agreement and thus bound by the forum selection 
clause. We now consider whether Atlantic Marine applies 
to a case in which one party is a contracting party and the 
other, though not a signatory, is nevertheless bound by a 
forum selection clause as an intended third-party 
beneficiary or closely related party. 
Krist argues that our Howmedica decision controls 
the result. In Howmedica, we addressed a situation in 
which signatory plaintiffs sought to bind non-signatory 
defendants to a forum selection clause as closely related 
parties, but we rejected their contention that the closely 
related parties doctrine applied. See 867 F.3d at 407 
& n.13. Having determined those non-signatories were not 
bound by the clause, we concluded they were properly 
treated as “non-contracting parties” and we announced an 
analytical framework to determine how forum selection 
clauses affect the § 1404(a) transfer analysis where the 
case involves both “contracting parties,” i.e., those bound 
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by a forum selection clause and thus subject to the 
presumption of Atlantic Marine, and “non-contracting 
parties,” i.e., those not bound by a forum selection clause 
and whose private interests therefore must still be 
considered. See 867 F.3d at 403–07. In that situation, we 
held, a court could not take an “all or nothing” approach 
in applying Atlantic Marine. Id. at 406. If some parties are 
not bound by a forum selection clause, a court must 
consider those parties’ private interests under 
Howmedica’s analytical framework. Id. at 403–04. 
Kashi and Krist read Howmedica as adopting a 
“bright-line” rule: Atlantic Marine applies only to 
signatory parties. Kashi Resp. 30; Krist Pet’r 12. Under 
their reading, even if they are bound by the forum selection 
clause, their private interests must be considered on a § 
1404(a) motion. In other words, they ask us to hold that 
the Atlantic Marine modification applies only when all 
parties signed the contract—it does not apply when non-
signatories, regardless of their status as third-party 
beneficiaries or as closely related parties, are present in the 
action. Howmedica did not go so far, and we reject their 
request. 
This argument is most easily analyzed through use 
of a counterfactual. Suppose a non-signatory intended 
third-party beneficiary brings a breach of contract claim, 
as would be his right under traditional principles of 
contract law. Despite his non-signatory status, he is fully 
aware of the contract and its terms. Indeed, he expressly 
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bases his claim on the terms of the contract. The contract 
also contains a forum selection clause, and his breach of 
contract claim falls within the scope of that clause. As 
such, there is no question that the non-signatory is bound 
by the forum selection clause. Despite being bound by that 
clause, the plaintiff files his breach of contract suit in a 
jurisdiction other than the one specified in the clause. The 
signatory defendant invokes the forum selection clause 
and moves to transfer venue under § 1404(a). In this case, 
must the district court consider the non-signatory 
plaintiff’s choice of forum and private interests? Or does 
the court consider only the public interest factors, per 
Atlantic Marine?  
 The latter must be true. Such an eyes-wide-open 
plaintiff—one who gets the benefit of the parties’ bargain 
and has the corresponding right to sue—would be bound 
by the terms of the forum selection clause just as the 
signatories would be.  
 The facts before us are different, but the underlying 
principle is the same. The Atlantic Marine modification 
applies to the § 1404(a) transfer inquiry if: (1) a non-
signatory is bound by a forum selection clause under 
traditional contract law principles; (2) enforcement of the 
clause against him was foreseeable; and (3) his claim falls 
within the scope of the clause. Indeed, Atlantic Marine 
recognized that foreseeability offsets “[w]hatever 
‘inconvenience’ [a party] would suffer by being forced to 
litigate in the contractual forum.” 571 U.S. at 64 (quoting 
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The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17–18 
(1972)).10  
IV. Conclusion 
 These petitions raise complicated issues concerning 
forum selection clauses. We conclude that the District 
Court in Kashi reached the correct result in declining to 
transfer the action. We conclude that the District Court in 
Krist erred in transferring the action, but the error was not 
clear and indisputable. As such, we decline to issue a writ 
of mandamus in either case. 
                                                 
10  McGraw-Hill does not argue that transfer would be 
warranted in the Krist action under a traditional § 1404(a) 
analysis, and we see no reason why the balancing 
conducted by Judge Beetlestone in Kashi would produce a 
different result in the Krist action. In fact, given Krist’s 
place of residence, the private interest factors in Krist 
slightly favor the Philadelphia forum.  
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Kashi and Krist came to court with exactly the same 
claim against McGraw-Hill; their license agreements with 
Corbis were identical; they both defended against identical 
McGraw-Hill motions to transfer; and they even had the same 
lawyer.  Yet, the District Courts came to opposite 
conclusions—the Kashi court denied McGraw-Hill’s transfer 
motion and the Krist court granted it.  Now, on petitions for 
mandamus, the two cases have been consolidated.  Even 
though the majority finds that the Krist court erred in 
transferring the case, it fails to correct the error and leaves 
opposing District Court decisions untouched.  The majority 
prioritizes adherence to the strict standards of mandamus relief 
over judicial consistency and equal treatment of the parties.  I 
do not.  
 
The majority concludes that even though the District 
Court in Krist should not have granted McGraw-Hill’s motion 
to transfer, mandamus is not warranted.  Specifically, in Krist’s 
case, it holds that the judge’s error in transferring the action 
was not “a clear and indisputable abuse of discretion or . . .  
error of law,” and even if it was, there is no basis for exercising 
our discretion to grant the writ.1  It emphasizes the incredibly 
high bar petitioners must meet in order to receive mandamus 
relief and tells us that even if petitioners do meet the bar, the 
court can still deny mandamus.2  However, the majority fails 
                                              
1 Majority at 31-34. 
  
2 Majority at 13-15; 31-34.  
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to grapple with the fact that its decision permits the 
incongruous and unfair treatment of essentially 
indistinguishable litigants.  Krist is left in the dust of this 
decision, correct on the law but without his remedy. 
  
Leaving undisturbed contradictory decisions in these 
two identical and consolidated cases promotes judicial 
inconsistency.  Litigants—and the public at large—expect 
courts to come to the same conclusion when presented with the 
same claims and facts.  Allowing opposite results in two 
consolidated cases with the same legal issues and the same 
factual background—even when done in the name of 
adherence to the strict standards of mandamus relief—erodes 
the integrity of and the public trust in the courts.3   Indeed, in 
other contexts, federal courts have corrected contradictory, yet 
factually analogous, lower court decisions in the name of 
judicial consistency.4   
                                              
3We have already recognized the importance of judicial 
consistency to the integrity of courts in the context of judicial 
estoppel.  This doctrine “generally prevents a party from 
prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then 
relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another 
phase.”  New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) 
(quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227, n.8 (2000)).  
Because this rule prevents the “risk of inconsistent court 
determinations” it “protect[s] the essential integrity of the 
judicial process.”  New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 751 
(2001). 
4 See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Expl. Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 
1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing decision of one district 
court to align with decision of another in a consolidated appeal 
“in the interest[] of consistency”); Dallas Ceramic Co. v. 




In addition to promoting inconsistency, the majority’s 
decision violates basic principles of fairness.  While Kashi 
pursues his case in the forum he originally chose, Krist is 
forced to litigate in a forum of the defendant’s choosing.  
Litigants should come to our courts knowing that the merits of 
their claims and defenses will determine the outcome of their 
cases—not the judge randomly selected to be on the case.  
Instead, the majority tells Krist that his judge made the wrong 
decision but that he cannot have the same remedy as Kashi.  
This result is unfair.   
 
Therefore, I propose a modified mandamus standard 
when considering whether to grant a writ in consolidated 
petitions.  First, we should consider whether denying 
mandamus would create an inconsistent result or unequal 
application of law.  If so, the petitioner need not show “a clear 
abuse of discretion or clear error of law.”5  Rather, it is 
sufficient for the petitioner to show simply reversible error.  In 
other words, the first factor in the three-factor test for granting 
                                              
United States, 598 F.2d 1382, 1391 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing 
district court decision to align with factually and legally 
analogous Tax Court decision because our “sense of judicial 
consistency dictates that these two cases should come out the 
same”); In re Cole, 114 B.R. 278, 279, 286 (N.D. Okla. 1990) 
(correcting conflicting rulings by two bankruptcy court judges 
where the “fact pattern in all of the[] proceedings [was] 
virtually identical”).  
5 Majority at 13 (quoting United States v. Wright, 776 F.3d 134, 
146 (3d Cir. 2015)) (emphasis added). 
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mandamus relief 6 would not be such a “high bar”7 in a 
consolidated petition like this one.   If we were to apply this 
modified standard here, because “the District Court in Krist 
erred in its conclusion . . . and in transferring his case,”8 the 
Krist court committed reversible error.  Krist met the modified 
standard for factor one.  We would then grant Krist’s writ.9   
 
As the majority reminds us, relief via a writ of 
mandamus is extraordinary and judges should “proceed both 
carefully and courageously in exercising their discretion” to 
grant a writ.10   There are good reasons why mandamus relief 
is rare and difficult to achieve.  Such relief disrupts a case’s 
“flow through the judicial system” and “is contrary to the 
common law policy of avoiding piecemeal appellate review of 
cases.”11  If every potentially erroneous decision could be 
resolved on a writ of mandamus, our appellate courts would be 
overwhelmed and litigants would await final resolution of their 
cases far longer than they already do.12   
                                              
6 The three factors are set forth on page 13 of the majority 
opinion and include: “(1) a clear abuse of discretion or clear 
error of law; (2) a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate 
relief; and (3) a likelihood of irreparable injury.” 
7 Majority at 14.  
8 Majority at 31.  
9 The other two factors are met here. See Majority at 14 
(“[T]ransfer orders as a class meet the second and third 
requirements.”). 
10 Majority at 15 (quoting Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 
1070 (3d Cir. 1988)).  
11 Lusardi, 855 F.2d at 1069. 
12 See In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 290 
(5th Cir. 2015) (“[M]andamus must not become a means by 




However, these concerns are minimized here due to the 
limited application of this proposed modification.  The lower 
standard for factor one of the mandamus test would only apply 
to (1) consolidated petitions for mandamus; (2) where the 
district courts had come to opposite decisions on substantially 
similar facts; and (3) where denying mandamus would create 
incompatible results and/or an unequal application of law.  
Such cases are extremely rare.  This narrow exception makes 
room in our mandamus jurisprudence for judicial consistency 
and equal administration of justice without risking significant 
disruptions in litigation or increases in burdensome piecemeal 
litigation. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s decision to deny mandamus in Krist, and concur 
with the ruling that mandamus is not warranted in Kashi. 
                                              
which the court corrects all potentially erroneous orders.”) 
(citing In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 310 (5th 
Cir. 2008)); see also Majority at 14-15.  
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